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A B S T R A C T
We add to the debate on the determinants of ﬁrms’ green investment strategies (GIS) by looking at societal
stakeholders and explicitly testing the role of local environmental non-proﬁt organizations (ENPOs) in GIS
engagement by family and non-family ﬁrms. We argue that ENPOs favor GIS engagement only by family
ﬁrms, which, due to their resource constraints, risk aversion and local embeddedness, are more sensitive
to ENPOs normative pressure. We also suggest that the role of ENPOs is especially important for family
ﬁrms’ GIS in those sectors with less stringent regulations, where ENPOs may act as a substitute for the
coercive pressure of regulation, and promote ﬁrms’ self-regulatory behaviors. We test and ﬁnd support for
our arguments on a sample of about 2000 Italian manufacturing ﬁrms over the period 2001–2003. Our
results are robust to the control of observable omitted variables, reverse causality and to alternative model
speciﬁcations.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
European Union (EU) members are increasingly under scrutiny
to achieve a sustainable growth path. The raising of environmental
concerns at the EU level is reﬂected in the proliferation of regulations
and actions by the Union over the last decade. The launch of the EU
Resource Eﬃciency Roadmap in 2001, the creation of the Emissions
Trading System to monitor CO2 emissions in 2005, and the empha-
sis on the achievement of a sustainable pattern of economic growth
in the Horizon 2020 program are some of the initiatives document-
ing the EU pressure on member states to promote a green-friendly
growth.
In addition to the coercive pressure of the EU and national envi-
ronmental regulators, private ﬁrms are also exposed to the norma-
tive pressure of other secondary stakeholders, which increasingly
* Corresponding author.
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(G.D. Santangelo).
call for an environmental sustainable behavior of economic agents.
These stakeholders are societal stakeholders, and mobilize public
opinion in favor or in opposition to ﬁrm’s decisions and operations
that may have an environmental impact (Clarkson, 1995; Etzion,
2007).
The emergence of societal stakeholders is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon and a source of diverse external pressures to the ﬁrm (Doh
and Guay, 2004; Etzion, 2007; Mitchell et al., 1997) because these
stakeholders, unlike primary stakeholders (i.e. management and
non-management employees, consumers and suppliers), do not have
a formal contractual bond with the ﬁrm (Freeman, 2004; Henriques
and Sadorsky, 1996; Mitchell et al., 1997).
Among societal stakeholders, the emergence of environmental
non-proﬁt organizations (ENPOs) dates back to a couple of decades
and strictly connects to the growing awareness of environmental
issues in civil society (Doh and Guay, 2004). Because ﬁrms are not
contractually or legally obliged to ENPOs, these societal stakehold-
ers generally utilize indirect approaches (e.g. public protests, civil
suits and letter writing campaigns) to inﬂuence ﬁrms environmen-
tal strategy (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; Sharma and Henriques, 2005).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.03.026
0921-8009/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Still, the action of ENPOs may substantially harm ﬁrms’ reputation
and competitiveness (Eesley and Lenox, 2006), and ENPOs normative
pressure may both reinforce the coercive pressure of regulations and
compensate for the lack of it.
Yet, despite the recently recognized relevance of different
external environmental pressures on green management practices
(Appolloni et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2016), the environmental eco-
nomic literature, has overlooked the role of non-proﬁt organizations
(NPOs) as distinctive societal stakeholders. The few aggregate analy-
ses, which have investigated the role of local societal stakeholders as
a relevant force driving ﬁrms’ environmental behavior, have either
focused on local communities, or bundled ENPOs together with other
societal stakeholders (Aden et al., 1999; Bernauer et al., 2013; Cribb,
1990; Epstein and Schnietz, 2002; Fredriksson et al., 2005; Neu-
mayer and Perkins, 2004; Triguero et al., 2013). The distinctive role of
ENPOs gains great relevance in connection to different organizational
forms and to family ﬁrms especially, because these are the dominant
organizational form around the world (Gersick et al., 1997; Porta et
al., 1999) and have been found to bemore responsive to local societal
pressure (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
A rigorous research on the role ENPOs play in inﬂuencing ﬁrms
green behavior is still missing. We aim at ﬁlling this gap by inves-
tigating the inﬂuence of ENPOs operating in the ﬁrms’ local context
on the engagement in green investments strategies (GIS) (i.e., invest-
ments in environmentally oriented equipments) by family and non-
family ﬁrms. Based on stakeholder theory (Eesley and Lenox, 2006;
Freeman, 2004; Guay et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 1997) and orga-
nization science (Berrone et al., 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007),
we suggest that family ﬁrms are more responsive to ENPOs pres-
sure than non-family ﬁrms and, hence, more likely to engage in GIS
because their resource constraints make them less capable to bear
the costs of head-to-head confrontation with ENPOs (Gomez-Me-
jia et al., 2003; Hamelin, 2013; Zellweger and Sieger, 2012), and, at
the same time, they need to build a positive reputation that “may
serve as a form of social insurance protecting the ﬁrm’s assets in
times of crisis” (dye, 2006). In addition, we investigate how local
ENPOs interact with sectoral regulations by disclosing the exis-
tence of a substitutability linkage in prompting family ﬁrms’ GIS
engagement.
We test our arguments in the manufacturing sector in Italy,
which represents a suitable research setting. According to Euro-
stat, Italy ranks among the developed countries recording the high-
est percentage of environmental expenditures of the manufactur-
ing sector. Italy also displays a high geographical heterogeneity in
terms of environmental performance, and number of local ENPOs
(such as Italia Nostra, Legambiente and Verdi Ambiente e Soci-
eta’). Finally, in the country family ﬁrms account for a large share
in the economy (Corbetta and Montemerlo, 1999), which Euro-
pean Family Businesses estimates about 75% of all active ﬁrms in
Italy.1
The work is structured as follows. The next section reviews the
background literature and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3
discusses data and empirical strategy. Section 4 illustrates the
results. Finally, conclusions are discussed in Section 5.
2. Background Literature and Hypotheses
Our research connects to the increasing effort of the environmen-
tal economics literature to disclose the drivers of ﬁrms’ environmen-
tal behavior. To this end, we focus on GIS and draw on stakeholder
theory and organization science to explore the differential role of
1 http://www.europeanfamilybusinesses.eu/
local ENPOs in shaping environmental responsible behavior of family
and non-family ﬁrms.
In relation to primary stakeholders, a number of studies have
explored customers’ pressure, demand, satisfaction and beneﬁts as
a driver of ﬁrms’ environmental behavior (Horbach et al., 2012;
Kammerer, 2009; Rehfeld et al., 2007). The relevance of societal
stakeholders has been studied both at macro and micro level.
At macro level, extant research suggests that the demand from
civil society, either direct or channeled by non-governmental organi-
zations (a speciﬁc type of NPOs), can foster countries’ environmental
performance (Bernauer et al., 2013; Fredriksson et al., 2005; Neu-
mayer and Perkins, 2004). Environmental NGOs can exert pressure
both on governments by promoting the ratiﬁcation, enforcement and
compliance of international treaties and national regulations.
In connection to ﬁrms’ adoption of cleaner production technolo-
gies and behavior, the role of ENPOs has been investigated primarily
by means of case studies, which have shown that environmental
activists can impose losses topollutingﬁrms (Cribb, 1990;Epsteinand
Schnietz, 2002). A few quantitative ﬁrm-level studies have focused
on local communities and societal stakeholders (Aden et al., 1999;
Becker, 2003;Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2009), but typically bundled these
different actors altogether. In sum,work in environmental economics
seemstohaveso faroverlookedthedistinctive roleofENPOs, although
the salience of this societal stakeholder has increased drastically in
the last couple of decades (Doh and Guay, 2004).
A widespread local presence of ENPOs can inﬂuence ﬁrm’s GIS
through different channels. First, ﬁrmsmay be encouraged to engage
in GIS by the desire to avoid costs related to civil suits initiated
by the local ENPOs as well as the protests local ENPOs may orga-
nize to physically stop ﬁrm’s activities (Argenti, 2004). Second, ﬁrm’s
GIS may be motivated by the will to avoid negative media exposure
and reputation damages resulting from the activities of local ENPOs
(Deephouse and Carter, 2005). In addition, the presence of ENPOs
may reﬂect locally shared beliefs and values (Binder and Blanken-
berg, 2016), which management and non-management employees,
who have been raised and/or live in the local context, can bring in
the ﬁrm, thus exerting a direct impact on the ﬁrm environmental
strategy (Doh and Guay, 2006). At the same time, local ENPOs may
favor the emergence of locally shared beliefs and values by increasing
other stakeholders’ (e.g. consumers) awareness on environmental
issues (Sharma and Henriques, 2005).
Yet, ﬁrms are heterogeneous in the way they respond to norma-
tive pressures (Murillo-Luna et al., 2008). The inﬂuence of ENPOs on
ﬁrms’ GIS may then critically depend on the ﬁrm’s organizational
form. In particular, we expect a stronger impact of ENPOs on fam-
ily ﬁrms because these ﬁrms are more resource-constrained and, at
the same time, more dependent on the local context than non-family
ﬁrms. Due to their typical smaller size, family ﬁrms suffer from
capital constraints and, hence, are reluctant to adopt riskier behav-
ior and aggressive competition strategies than non-family ﬁrms
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Hamelin, 2013; Zellweger and Sieger,
2012). Relatively limited resources may deter also family ﬁrms from
head-to-head confrontation with local ENPOs in order to avoid costs
related to ENPOs protests, which may stop or delay production, legal
costs associated to civil suits initiated by ENPOs, and the costs related
to ﬁnes resulting from ENPOs denounces. While large businesses
would eventually have the resources to face such costs, family ﬁrms
may prefer to compel with ENPOs normative pressure and proac-
tively engage in GIS, valuing GIS engagement less costly than the
costs of ﬁghting against ENPOs. Furthermore, GIS engagement can
yield reputational beneﬁts in the local context where the ﬁrm is
traditionally embedded. These beneﬁts are especially relevant for
family than non-family ﬁrms because, in virtue of their greater
local embeddedness (Graaﬂand, 2002), family businesses are more
dependent on the local context for their survival than their non-
family counterparts (Clarkson, 1995) and, hence, they strive to gain
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local legitimacy by building trustworthy relationships with stake-
holders (Cennamo et al., 2009; Jones and Wicks, 1999; Laplume et
al., 2008). They are committed to project and perpetuate a posi-
tive family image and reputation (Westhead et al., 2001). Family
ﬁrms also strive to receive recognition for generous actions (Schulze
et al., 2001), to enjoy personal prestige in the community and to
have social support among friends and acquaintances (Stafford et
al., 1999), as well as to maintain group integrity (Habbershon and
Pistrui, 2002). Hence, they value “social worthiness”, that is the legit-
imacy derived from conformity to local expectations (Thornton and
Ocasio, 1999). As a result, family ﬁrms are more sensitive to socio-
emotional rewards, and they also regard, in addition to economic
outcomes, non-economic utilities such as “socio-emotional wealth”
or “affective endowments” as a means to preserve and nurture their
local embeddedness (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), and are eventually
more environmentally responsible (Berrone et al., 2010). We then
expect family ﬁrms to bemore responsive to the normative pressures
stemming from the local context where they operate and, in par-
ticular, to the requests of the local communities channeled by local
ENPOs. Hence, we posit:
Hypothesis 1. The larger the presence of local ENPOs, the greater the
likelihood of GIS engagement by family than non-family ﬁrms.
The inﬂuence of ENPOs on family ﬁrms’ GIS engagement, how-
ever, may vary across sectors depending on the sectoral stringency
of environmental regulations. Given the direct impact that ﬁrms’
production activities and their environmental performance can have
on the local area where they operate, local ENPOs exert a norma-
tive pressure for environmental friendly behavior (Eesley and Lenox,
2006) substituting for the coercive pressure exerted by regulators
(Mitchell et al., 1997). This argument mirrors Bernauer et al. (2013).
They ﬁnd that environmental NGOs, play an important role in coun-
tries’ participation to international environmental agreements, but
their importance decreases with the democracy level of the coun-
try. Environmental NGOs, indeed, would compensate for the lack of
a large number of political forces and demand channels, which char-
acterize democratic countries. A similar mechanism can apply in our
context.
Absent regulations or lax regulatory enforcement typically lower
production costs, and favor ﬁrm polluting investments and local
environmental degradation (Madsen, 2009). Local ENPOs may exert
a higher pressure in those sectors where no strict regulation obliges
ﬁrms to invest in environment due to either a lower pollution
intensity or a weaker attention by policy-makers. Hence, in these
sectors ﬁrms’ environmental performance mostly depends on self-
regulatory strategies. In particular, ENPOs can push local ﬁrms to
adapt new environmental standards and ease innovation (as in the
weaker version of the Porter Hypothesis), and eventually ﬁrms’ com-
petitiveness (as in the stronger version of the Porter Hypothesis)
(Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995). In both cases, the
ENPOs action may be assimilated to market-based environmental
policies, which, unlike traditional command-and-control regulatory
programs, provide greater ﬂexibility to internalize pollution and
may be especially appropriate in connection to resource-constrained
ﬁrms such as family businesses. We then expect that local ENPOs
spur ﬁrms’ GIS comparatively more in those sectors where family
ﬁrms are exposed to a lower level of environmental stringency. Thus,
we suggest:
Hypothesis 2. A large presence of local ENPOs substitutes for the
strength of sectoral environmental regulations on the likelihood of a
family ﬁrm engaging in GIS.
3. Data and Empirical Framework
3.1. Data
For our empirical analysis, we rely on the 9th wave of the Capi-
talia (formerly Mediocredito Centrale) survey, which provides cross-
sectional information on Italian manufacturing ﬁrms’ characteristics
and their activities for the year 2003 and a number of time-varying
information for the period 2001–2003. The dataset covers all ﬁrms
withmore than 500 employees and a sample of ﬁrmswithmore than
10 and less than 500 employees, which are selected stratifying by
sector, size class and geographical area.
Drawing on a large literature on family business and the EU
deﬁnition (Chrisman et al., 2012; Commission, 2009; Miller et al.,
2011; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010;
Zahra, 2010), we deﬁne family ﬁrms based on both family involve-
ment in the ﬁrm ownership and the presence of family managers in
the ﬁrm board. Then, resting on the information available in the Cap-
italia survey, we operationalize this deﬁnition as those ﬁrms whose
main shareholder is a physical individual, and whose entrepreneurs
and executives belonging to the family account for a share greater
than 50% in the ﬁrm board. Also, to unambiguously identify fam-
ily business, we exclude from our family ﬁrm deﬁnition those ﬁrms
belonging to a group, ﬁrms listed on the stock exchange and foreign-
owned ﬁrms because in all these cases the role of the family may
be limited.2 Foreign-owned ﬁrms are identiﬁed as those controlled
by foreign shareholders owing at least 10% of the ﬁrm’s capital
share.3
The Capitalia dataset, which has been used in previous studies
(e.g. Antonietti and Marzucchi (2014)), serves our research purposes
to explore the impact of ENPOs on ﬁrms’ activities. In the early 2000s,
ENPOs were still an emerging phenomenon and ﬁrms’ green actions
were mainly implemented on a voluntary basis due to less strict reg-
ulations and the lower green awareness spread in civil society at
the time. Over the 2000s the increase in environmental stringency4
has gone hand in hand with a raise in green consciousness of civil
society and a stronger normative pressure by ENPOs for green invest-
ments by ﬁrms. Yet, the enforcement of regulations remains still
far from being ideal.5 Thus, we believe that our analysis is not con-
ﬁned to the period and country we analyze, and they may also
offer insights in countries with low compliance of environmental
regulations.
To test the role of ENPOs on ﬁrms’ GIS engagement, we com-
bine the Capitalia survey with a number of territorial-level variables,
which we gather from different data sources as discussed below.
We consider territorial units at the NUTS3-level,6 which for Italy
correspond to 103 administrative provinces in the period of our
analysis.
2 In alternative speciﬁcations we test the robustness of our baseline models to
different family ﬁrms deﬁnitions, and ﬁnd support for our ﬁndings. Results are not
reported and available upon request.
3 The lack of information on the presence of entrepreneurs and executives resulted
in a loss of observations.
4 In the last two decades, Italy has implemented a number of initiatives at national
level (e.g., a new waste system based on a full-cost pricing tariff introduced in 1997
and implemented during the 2000s; a new Environmental Code in force since 2006; a
new legislation on environmental crimes issued in 2015) and actively participated in
initiatives at the European level (e.g., the 2001 EU Resource Eﬃciency Roadmap; the
Emission Trade System creation in 2005; the Horizon 2020 program) to safeguard the
environment and reduce pollutants’ emissions.
5 According to the 2015 “Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report” of the World
Economic Forum, Italy ranks 49th (84th) over 141 countries in terms of stringency of
environmental regulations (enforcement of environmental regulations) as perceived
in the Executive Opinion Survey administered by the Forum.
6 NUTS stands for the Nomenclature of Territorial Units of Statistics developed by
Eurostat.
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3.2. Dependent Variable
In the Capitalia survey ﬁrms are requested to declare the impor-
tance of the reduction of the environmental impact of their activity as
motivation driving their decisions to undertake tangible investments
during the period 2001–2003. Firms have the possibility to choose
among three values: low, medium and high. We create a dummy
(GreenInv) taking value 1 if the ﬁrm rates the motivation of “environ-
mental impact reduction” as “high” or “medium”, 0 if it rates it as
“low”. The decision to use a binary variable instead of focusing on an
ordinal variable rests on the kind of information collected by the sur-
vey. While the environmental impact is a cogent concern for ﬁrms
active in pollution-intensive sectors, other motivations can take pri-
ority for ﬁrms active in sectors characterized by lower pollution
intensity. Firms in less polluted sectors could value less their envi-
ronmental sustainability than other goals. Hence, our binarymeasure
is more likely to reﬂect the ﬁrm’s green attitude rather than the sec-
toral distribution of our sample ﬁrms. The use of the binary variable
represents also a reasonable alternative to environmental expendi-
tures and investments, which are not available in the survey, because
our indicator can still capture the effort of the ﬁrm to internalize the
economy-wide environmental costs resulting from the ﬁrms activ-
ities. The same strategy has been adopted by Cainelli et al. (2015)
and similar proxies for green investments and innovations have been
used in other studies (De Marchi, 2012; Horbach, 2008). We, how-
ever, test the robustness of our baseline ﬁndings to the use of an
ordinal dependent variable as well as a proxy for the amount of green
investments.
According to our data, ﬁrms investing in the reduction of harm-
ful environmental impact account for 52.6% of investors and 45% of
the total sample, a ﬁgure that is in line with the existing evidence
in terms of share of eco-innovators (Cainelli et al., 2015; Horbach
et al., 2012). When focusing on ﬁrms’ ownership, we ﬁnd that fam-
ily ﬁrms, accounting for nearly 42% of the sample, present a lower
probability to engage in GIS than non-family ﬁrms (48.4 % versus
55.6 %).
Panels A and B in Fig. 1 show the geographical distribution of
ﬁrms engaging in GIS across Italian provinces for both family and
non-family ﬁrms. We disclose the existence of a substantial hetero-
geneity in ﬁrms’ green attitude over the geographical space. Also,
territorial differences in the GIS engagement emerge between fam-
ily and non-family ﬁrms, thus suggesting the existence of different
underlying determinants for the two groups of ﬁrms.
3.3. Independent Variables
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we retrieve information on the
number of NPOs engaged in the protection, defense and promo-
tion of environment at province level from the 1999 Istat (Italian
National Institute of Statistics) Census on non-proﬁt organizations.7
To account for the size of the province, we normalize this indicator by
the provincial population (source: Istat). Our main independent vari-
able is, thus, represented by the logarithm of the number of ENPOs
per capita (per million of inhabitants) in 1999 (ENPO_pcp).
Panel C in Fig. 1 shows the distribution of ENPO_pcp across Ital-
ian provinces. Nuoro, Belluno and Gorizia present a larger number of
ENPOs, while Ragusa, Agrigento and Taranto are located in the lower
tail of the variable distribution. While the Figure in part reﬂects the
7 We exclude those NPOs whose main activity consists of the protection of ani-
mals, which is not directly related to the promotion and protection of environmental
quality. Our results are however robust to the inclusion of these associations in
the deﬁnition of the independent variable. These estimations are not reported and
available upon request.
North-South economic divide, which characterizes Italy, it is worth
highlighting that some Northern provinces (e.g., Rimini and Venezia)
are in the lowest quartile of the distribution, and some Southern and
Central provinces (e.g. Cagliari and L’Aquila) are in the top quartile of
the distribution. There appears then to exist enough variation across
provinces to identify the role of local ENPOs in prompting ﬁrms’
GIS. Comparing this distribution with the diffusion of GIS engage-
ment among family and non-family ﬁrms (Panels A and B), it emerges
a higher correlation between the diffusion of ENPOs and the dis-
tribution of GIS engagement among family ﬁrms than non-family
ﬁrms.
To test Hypothesis 2, we exploit data on environmental taxes at
2-digit NACE sector level in 1999 from Eurostat, which are normal-
ized by sectoral value added (env_string). This indicator represents a
proxy for the stringency of existing environmental regulations and
their enforcement. We also exploit information on emissions (Brunel
and Levinson, 2013) to capture environmental regulatory stringency.
We consider higher levels of emission per unit of value added as
reﬂecting the presence of stringent regulations in the sector because
policy makers will devote more effort to regulate most polluting
activities. This is conﬁrmed for example by the current EU Emis-
sion Trade System in force in the EU since 2005, which regulates the
carbon dioxide emissions only for energy intensive sectors. Resting
on NAMEA data, we both use information on sectoral carbon diox-
ide (CO2) emissions, and we build an indicator of Global Warming
Potential (GWP) and acidiﬁcation.8
In our model, to account for local community pressure other
than ENPOs we also control for the presence of NPOs pursuing goals
different than the protection and defense of environment (non −
ENPOs_pcp) (e.g. labor unions).
In addition, following the existing literature (Horbach et al., 2012)
we account for market pull drivers, technology push, ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc factors and policy measures. As for the market pull drivers,
we control for the ﬁrm’s share of sales in the provincial mar-
ket (mkt_prov). We then add a dummy for ﬁrms that measure
customer satisfaction (satisfaction) and a dummy for ﬁrms with
ISO9000 quality certiﬁcation (quality_cert). All these measures are
retrieved from the Capitalia survey. Among technology push fac-
tors and ﬁrm internal resources, we test for the education level
of workforce measured with the share of employees with sec-
ondary and tertiary education (education), and with three dummies
denoting ﬁrm’s engagement in R&D activity (rd_status), the aﬃlia-
tion to a group (group), and the purchase of patents from abroad
(patentFor), respectively. Also, we include further ﬁrm-level vari-
ables from Capitalia which can reﬂect the pool of knowledge and
capabilities ﬁrms can exploit, and in particular, ﬁrm’s age (age),
ﬁrm size proxied by the number of employees (size), and cap-
ital intensity (kl) proxied by the book value of tangible assets
over the number of employees. Concerning policy measures, we
include the NUTS3-level share of sorted waste collection (wastesortedp )
(source: Istat), which could capture different local regulations in
force and a different attitude of local policy makers towards envi-
ronmental issues. We then control for further province-level indi-
cators capturing the local economic conditions in 1999, which
are the provincial value-added per capita (va_pcp) (source: Isti-
tuto Tagliacarne), and the employment share (emp_shp) (source:
Istat).
After dropping those ﬁrms presenting missing or inconsistent
values for the dependent variable and covariates we use in the anal-
ysis, we end up with a sample of 2744 ﬁrms. 2338 of these declare
8 Based on Eurostat, the GWP indicator is computed as CO2 +298 ∗N2O+25 ∗ CH4,
and the acidiﬁcation indicator as SOX + 0.7 ∗ NOX + 1.9 ∗ NH3 (http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Greenhouse_gas_emission_statistics).
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A
% Family firms undertaking GIS
B
% Non-family firms undertaking GIS
C
ENPOs per capita, 1999
Fig. 1. Numberof ENPOs per capita and ﬁrms’ GIS diffusion across Italian provinces.
quintiles of the distributions of ENPOs and ﬁrms’ GIS engagement are represented by means of different grey tonalities, with the darker ones identifying upper quintiles.
Source: Istat and Capitalia Survey. Authors’ calculations.
to undertake investments in tangible assets. The latter group of
ﬁrms represent the sample we use in our empirical strategy, which
counts 986 family ﬁrms and 1289 non-family ﬁrms. The focus on
investors may yield a mild sample selection bias that may affect
our estimates. We therefore address such a bias in our estimation
strategy.
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are reported in Table
A1 in the Appendix.
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3.4. Estimation Strategy
Due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, we estimate
the following cross-sectional probit model:9
Pr
(
GreenInvips = 1
)
= V(a+ bENPO pcp + dXi + 0Zp + cr + gs) (1)
where, GreenInvips is the dummy denoting whether ﬁrm i located in
province p and active in sector s engaged in GIS. ENPO_pcp is our
proxy for the local ENPOs. Xi and Zp are two vectors containing ﬁrm-
and province-level factors.
In all the estimates we also control for 2-digit NACE sector (gs)
and NUTS2 region-ﬁxed effects (cr). Sector-ﬁxed effects account
for both the pollution- and energy-intensity of ﬁrms’ main activ-
ity, which can be related to different stringency degrees in the
environmental regulations. Furthermore, region ﬁxed-effects cap-
ture a different enforcement of environmental regulations and a
different commitment of local authorities. While environmental leg-
islation is mainly attributed to the decisions of the central national
government, important interventions and duties are appointed and
decentralized to the autonomy of NUTS2 regions, which can play an
important role for the promotion of clean technologies and sustain-
able development strategies, the spread of environmental informa-
tion and education and the prevention of environmental degrada-
tion. The investigated effect is then identiﬁed across heterogeneous
provinces, but within homogeneous areas in terms of regional policy
interventions, policy enforcement, economic conditions and social
background.
Since our variable of interest (ENPO_pcp) presents a higher aggre-
gation than the dependent variable, we compute heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors which are clustered at provincial level in
order to correct for within-group correlation (Moulton, 1990).
Estimation of model (1) may be affected by amild potential selec-
tion bias stemming from the deﬁnition of GreenInvips just on the sample
of investors. We then estimate a probit model with sample selection
(Heckman, 1979) by means of maximum-likelihood. The selection
model consists of modeling the determinants of ﬁrms’ investment
choice, as reﬂected by a dummy (invest) taking value 1 for ﬁrms
engaging in tangible investments regardless of the underlying moti-
vation - and 0 for non-investors. As exclusion restriction affecting
selection, we use an indicator of credit constraints experienced by
a ﬁrm (credit_constr) (source: Capitalia), which measures the bank-
ing system’s refusal to grant further credit. While access to external
ﬁnancial resources allows ﬁrms to engage in the investment activ-
ity (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), it is unlikely to affect the motivation
underlying the investment decisions.
All ﬁrm-level variables refer either to the three-year period 2001–
2003 as our dependent variable (GreenInvips ) or, when time-varying
information is available, to the year 2001. Our variable of interest
(ENPO_pcp) is measured at time 1999, which is the year when Istat
conducted the ﬁrst census on NPOs.
The use of a pre-sample value helps in mitigating any potential
simultaneity concern in our analysis and allows for a time lag in
the response of ﬁrms to ENPOs’ expansion. In order to identify the
9 The estimation of a logit model yields exactly the same results both in terms of
signiﬁcance and magnitude of the effect. Also, according to the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), the two models are substan-
tially equivalent. We then decided to stick to the probit model. The estimation of a
linear probability model (LPM) instead, even if yields similar ﬁndings and magnitude
of the effect, delivers a lower goodness of ﬁt with respect to probit and logit mod-
els according to the AIC and BIC criteria. Logit estimations and LPM estimations are
available upon request.
effect of local ENPOs, province-level information is retrieved for the
same year 1999, and, when this was not possible, for either 2000 or
2001.
4. Results
4.1. The Impact of ENPOs on Firms’ GIS
Table 1 presents the baseline results and reports marginal effects
associated to each factor under investigation. In columns 1–2 we
address the potential selection bias resulting from the fact that not
all ﬁrms in our sample invest in tangible assets. We estimate, by
maximum-likelihood, the Eq. (1), which models the importance of
the reduction of the environmental impact as a motivation driv-
ing ﬁrms’ tangible investments, together with a selection equation,
which models a ﬁrm’s probability to invest in tangible assets. This
corresponds to implementing a Heckprobit estimation. The results
suggest that local ENPOs do not exert any inﬂuence on ﬁrms’ invest-
ment decisions, but display a positive and signiﬁcant association
with the importance ﬁrms attach to the reduction of the envi-
ronmental impact when undertaking tangible investments. Other
potential societal stakeholders, as proxied by non-ENPOs, do not play
instead any role.10
Evidence on the drivers of investment decisions is in line with
our expectations and existing literature. Larger ﬁrms, R&D perform-
ers and ﬁrms endowed with higher capital intensity are more likely
to engage in tangible investments. The importance of provincial cus-
tomers, as reﬂected by the provincial market share, promotes ﬁrms’
investments. Importantly, the indicator of credit constraints, which
represents our exclusion restriction, is signiﬁcant and reveals a lower
investment propensity for ﬁrms which face diﬃculties in collecting
ﬁnancial resources from the banking sector.11
Focusing on the determinants of GIS, ﬁrm size, capital intensity
and R&D status display a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, which highlights
the importance of internal resources and technology-push factors
(Cainelli et al., 2015). Variables capturing market-pull factors are sig-
niﬁcantly related to ﬁrms’ GIS. Other ﬁrm-level characteristics do not
play a signiﬁcant role. In terms of province-level controls, the share
of sorted waste collection has a positive impact on ﬁrms’ GIS and
could reﬂect beneﬁcial effects stemming from a stricter enforcement
of regulations.
The non-signiﬁcance of the Wald test of independent equations
reveals that there is no correlation between the two equations for
GreenInv and invest. This ﬁnding suggests that sample selection is not
an issue in our estimation. We then discard the selection equation
and estimate probit models by just focusing on ﬁrms’ probability to
undertake GIS.
Column 3 reports the baseline results gathered from the pro-
bit model that substantially replicate the ones discussed above. In
Columns 4–5 we then prove that the positive impact of ENPOs is
conﬁned to GIS engagement by family ﬁrms.12 As expected, no sig-
niﬁcant effect is detected for the sample of non-family ﬁrms, which
do not seem to be responsive to the pressure exerted by local ENPOs.
Moving to the magnitude of our ﬁnding, in column 4 we ﬁnd that a
100% increase in the provincial number of ENPOs per capita drives
to a 14.8 percentage-point increase in the probability that family
ﬁrms are driven by environment-based motivations in their GIS.
10 ENPO_pcp and non− ENPO_pcp are correlated at 0.68, but this correlation does not
sensitively affect the ENPO_pcp coeﬃcient, when we discard non − ENPO_pcp .
11 We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effect when the credit constraint indicator is
included in the model estimating the likelihood of GIS adoption.
12 In column [4] the variable group is omitted as we exclude ﬁrms belonging to any
group in our deﬁnition of family ﬁrms.
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More intuitively, comparing provinces at the 25th and 75th per-
centile of the distribution of ENPO_pcp, which are Reggio Calabria and
Ascoli Piceno respectively, we ﬁnd that the same family ﬁrm would
present a 9.33 percentage-point higher probability to engage in GIS
if it is located in Ascoli Piceno compared if it were located in Reg-
gio Calabria. Given the share of family ﬁrms which are driven by
environmental motivations in their investment activities - 48.28% -
the presence of local ENPOs emerges to be not only a statistically
but also an economically signiﬁcant driver affecting family ﬁrms’ GIS
engagement. Hypothesis 1 is then conﬁrmed.
4.2. Identiﬁcation and Robustness
We implement a number of identiﬁcation tests and sensitivity
checks to validate our ﬁndings.
First, we test the robustness of our results to the use of alterna-
tive dependent and independent variables, as reported in Table 2. In
columns 1–3 we investigate an ordinal dependent variable instead of
our binary variable. The ordinal dependent variable assumes value 1
if the ﬁrm’s assessment of the importance of “environmental impact
reduction” as motivation of tangible investments is “low”, 2 if the
ﬁrm’s assessment is “medium”, and 3 if it is “high”. In column 1
we implement an ordered probit, while in columns 2–3 we adopt
a multinomial logit, which compares13 ﬁrms assessing the impor-
tance of “environmental impact reduction” as “high” and “medium”
with those ﬁrms assessing the importance of “environmental impact
reduction” as “low”. Both estimations conﬁrm our results. It is worth
noting that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant difference in the ENPOs
inﬂuence on ﬁrms assessing the importance of their “environmental
impact“ as ”high” versus those assessing it as “medium”, with the
latter displaying a slightly higher coeﬃcient.
In columns 4–5 we extend our analysis by exploring the amount
of ﬁrms’ environmental investments. To remedy the lack of direct
information on such investments, we follow two strategies. In col-
umn 4 we use the total investment amount of ﬁrms over the period
2001–2003, and create a variable GreenV alueA equal to this amount
when GreenInv takes value 1, and 0 when GreenInv takes value 0. In
column 5, instead, we divide the total investment amounts among
all the objectives a ﬁrm declares to pursue14 by attributing to each
objective the same investment share, GreenV alueB. In both cases, we
estimate a tobit model and we corroborate our ﬁndings.15
In column 6, we then test the robustness of our empirical strat-
egy by substituting the share of volunteers in ENPOs over provincial
population for the log number of ENPOs per capita.16
13 We cannot implement a multiprobit model due to the presence of a large set of
ﬁxed effects that do not allow the model to convergence.
14 For all the possible objectives listed in the survey (i.e., improvement of exist-
ing products’ quality; expansion of existing products’ production value; introduction
of new products; reduction of the environmental impact; reduction of the use of
raw materials; reduction of the use of workforce), we build a dummy variable
equal to 1 if ﬁrms declare to assess that objective as being of either “high” or
“medium” importance, 0 otherwise, as in the construction of our dependent variable
GreenInv .
15 We lose some observations due to missing values for the investment amount.
16 The 1999 Census reports a suspicious value of this variable for the province of
Turin, and this anomaly is conﬁrmed when we compare the 1999 value with the
value retrieved from the 2011 Census. To remedy to this, we replaced this value
by discounting the 2011 value with the 2011/1999 growth rate in the number of
ENPOs in the Piedmont region (the NUTS2 region where Turin is located) by exclud-
ing Turin. We also tried to discount the 2011 value with the 2011/1999 growth
rate of ENPOs in Italy (by excluding Turin) and the growth in the number of other
NPOs in Turin. We have then re-estimated the model by discarding the province
of Turin. All these estimations conﬁrm the main ﬁndings and are available upon
request.
We also estimate the baseline model by excluding all ﬁrm-
and province-level covariates in order to rule out any collinearity
concern. Our main ﬁndings stay substantially unchanged. These
results are not reported, but available from the authors upon request.
In Table 3 we account for potential endogeneity issues by test-
ing for observable omitted variables and reverse causality concerns.
In columns 1–2, borrowing from Mazzanti et al. (2011) we test
for decentralized policy interventions in the waste management.
In particular, in 1997 Italy issued the 22/1997 Law, which intro-
duced a new waste system based on a full-cost pricing tariff instead
of the old tax that was related to the size of household living
spaces. The new legislation did not completely abolish the previ-
ous tax, but allowed for a transition period. The adoption of this
new tariff-based system could, thus, reﬂect the level of policy com-
mitment at province-level and then proxy the role of regulatory
stakeholders. Despite the control for region dummies, differences
in environmental regulations across provinces could still affect our
baseline ﬁndings. Thus, we include the share of provincial municipal-
ities (newwasteShMunicipalities) and the share of provincial population
(newwasteShPop) covered by the new tariff respectively, in the model.
Both indicators refer to the year 2000 and are retrieved from the
2001 Italian Environmental Agency’s waste report (source: APAT
2001).
We then control for social capital. Higher level of social capi-
tal reﬂects higher altruism and interest for third parties, and this
could drive a higher propensity of ﬁrms to take the responsibility of
their actions and adopt social responsible behaviors. In column 3, we
include an index of social capital (soc_capitalp) (Cartocci, 2007)17. In
column 4, we control for the size of the informal sector (informalp)
estimated for the province in 2003 (source: Istat). The latter indicator
can capture both the level of legality and the altruistic values spread
in a territory.
In column 5, we further include in our estimates a variable
capturing the share of adult population with secondary education
(secondary_edup) (source: Istat). A lower education level, indeed,
could reduce damages awarded to polluting ﬁrms in case of environ-
mental accidents or any lawsuits for environmental responsibility
(Becker, 2003). While all additional controls do not bear a signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient, the effect captured by our variable of interest is not
affected.
In column 6 we substitute 2-digit for 4-digit NACE sector ﬁxed-
effects. This allows to capture the heterogeneity in pollution and
energy intensity across very detailed sectors, at the cost of a small
drop in the number of observations. Some sector dummies, indeed,
perfectly predicts the probability to engage in GIS for some ﬁrms.
Again, no signiﬁcant difference is disclosed in our estimations and
the coeﬃcient even slightly increases in the magnitude.18
These analyses show that our result is robust to the control of
observable omitted variables.
17 Cartocci (2007) computes a synthetic index of social capital which is obtained
by implementing a principal component analysis on four different variables:
average turnout in national elections, European elections, and referenda during
the 1990s; newspapers diffusion; membership to sport associations; blood dona-
tions. We follow existing literature (Nannicini et al., 2013) and we exploit this
indicator to capture social capital spread across Italian provinces. In particular,
we follow Guiso et al. (2010) and exploit a notion of social capital reﬂecting
civic capital, that is “those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help
a group overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable
activities”.
18 We also test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of a number of vari-
ables capturing the international involvement of both ﬁrms and provinces based
on a growing literature supporting the existence of a signiﬁcant nexus between
ﬁrms’ internationalization and green attitude (Cole et al., 2008; De Marchi, 2012).
These results, which are available from the authors upon request, replicate the main
ﬁndings.
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Table 1
The role of local ENPOs in ﬁrms’ GIS engagementa .
Heckman Baseline Family Non-family
GreenInv invest
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
ENPOs_pcp 0.085*** 0.022 0.081*** 0.148*** 0.039
[0.026] [0.018] [0.025] [0.035] [0.036]
non − ENPOs_pcp −0.03 −0.041 −0.036 −0.107 0.023
[0.049] [0.030] [0.047] [0.067] [0.067]
mkt_prov 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
satisfaction 0.045** 0.008 0.044** 0.048 0.049*
[0.023] [0.016] [0.022] [0.037] [0.028]
quality_cert 0.057** 0.002 0.059*** 0.019 0.100***
[0.023] [0.018] [0.022] [0.034] [0.031]
education −0.025 −0.027 −0.016 −0.045 −0.01
[0.050] [0.025] [0.049] [0.070] [0.055]
rd_status 0.091*** 0.125*** 0.092*** 0.128*** 0.075**
[0.020] [0.012] [0.019] [0.029] [0.032]
group 0.002 −0.008 0.004 −0.01
[0.021] [0.018] [0.021] [0.028]
patentFor 0.096 0.03 0.098 0.123 0.08
[0.075] [0.066] [0.074] [0.131] [0.090]
age 0.008 −0.005 0.008 0.023 0.001
[0.021] [0.010] [0.018] [0.027] [0.021]
size 0.041** 0.053*** 0.037** −0.01 0.055***
[0.016] [0.010] [0.014] [0.024] [0.015]
kl 0.020* 0.022*** 0.019* 0.018 0.016
[0.011] [0.007] [0.011] [0.015] [0.012]
wastesortedp 0.003** 0.003* 0.003** 0.004* 0.002
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
va_pcp −0.004 −0.007 −0.01 −0.112 0.056
[0.048] [0.037] [0.047] [0.072] [0.055]
emp_shp −0.074 0.077 −0.087 −0.509 0.253
[0.285] [0.261] [0.271] [0.498] [0.428]
cred_cons −0.061**
[0.030]
Observations 2620 2620 2275 986 1288
Log-Lik −2394.899 −2394.899
Censored 375 375
q −0.087 −0.087
Wald-Indep P-value 0.914 0.914
Pseudo R2 0.056 0.069 0.084
P-value difference 0.036
Fixed effects
2-digit Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NUTS2 Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
a All columns report marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered by NUTS 3 region are in brackets. P-value difference reports the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference in
the coeﬃcient between equations.
*p<10%; ** p< 5% level; *** p< 1%
The analysis of the effect of an aggregated indicator (ENPOs) on
a microeconomic outcome (ﬁrms GIS) helps mitigate any further
endogeneity issue. Furthermore, if our estimation was affected by
a potential reverse causality, the latter would presumably drive to
a downward bias of the estimated coeﬃcient associated to ENPOs
and, as a consequence, our result would be, at worst, a lower
bound estimate of the real effect of ENPOs on ﬁrms’ GIS. Indeed,
we eventually expect that ﬁrms’ harmful behaviors for the envi-
ronment would engender the reaction of civil society and the cre-
ation of new ENPOs. If this effect was in force and was affecting
our estimation, the effect of ENPOs would be even stronger than
the one we have detected. To directly address the reverse causal-
ity concern, we implement an instrumental variable approach on
the probit model in Eq. (1). We exploit two province-level vari-
ables as instruments. The ﬁrst is the rainfall per squared kilometer
in the province (rainfall) (source: Istat, 1997 Statistiche Metereo-
logiche), which has been found by the literature as reducing air
pollution (Ouyang et al., 2015). A high level of rainfall, by improving
the air quality could actually reduce the incentive and need for
ENPOs pressure. We then expect this variable to be negatively asso-
ciated to the variable of our interest, ENPOs_pc. The second instru-
ment is an indicator that captures the level of provincial unused
housing stock (unused_housing) measuring the number of housing
facilities which are not exploited (source: Istat). We expect this
indicator to be positively associated with the presence of ENPOs
since it would reﬂect a lower care for the existing residential
housing stock and a consequent ENPOs pressure to protect the
territory. The ﬁrst stage estimation delivers the expected results
on the relationship between ENPOs_pc and the two instruments.19
19 Findings are conﬁrmed when we implement the instrumental variable approach
on a linear probability model. In this case, the Hansen test reveals the validity of our
instruments and F-tests of the ﬁrst stage conﬁrm the strength of the instruments we
exploit.
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Table 2
Alternative dependent and independent variablesa .
Ordered Multinomial logit GreenV alueA GreenV alueB ENPOs_volp
Probit High Medium
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ENPOs_pcp 0.310*** 0.503** 0.722*** 4.132*** 3.719***
[0.089] [0.220] [0.199] [1.073] [0.958]
ENPOs_volp 43.439***
[16.717]
non − ENPOs_pcp −0.286* −0.620** −0.357 −2.676 −2.525 −0.019
[0.148] [0.312] [0.372] [1.906] [1.698] [0.062]
mkt_prov 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.014 0.001
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.016] [0.014] [0.001]
satisfaction 0.101 0.181 0.21 1.19 1.005 0.048
[0.092] [0.229] [0.196] [1.106] [0.982] [0.037]
quality_cert 0.087 0.316 −0.046 0.407 0.355 0.015
[0.087] [0.221] [0.185] [1.079] [0.962] [0.034]
education −0.02 0.105 −0.381 −1.05 −0.992 −0.047
[0.187] [0.459] [0.343] [2.083] [1.855] [0.070]
rd_status 0.265*** 0.472** 0.622*** 3.848*** 3.379*** 0.129***
[0.081] [0.208] [0.147] [0.835] [0.745] [0.029]
patentFor 0.349 0.862 0.272 3.861 3.536 0.097
[0.355] [0.794] [0.626] [3.246] [2.894] [0.130]
age 0.033 0.012 0.166 0.593 0.523 0.022
[0.070] [0.170] [0.138] [0.759] [0.672] [0.028]
size −0.054 −0.177 0.031 0.393 0.408 −0.008
[0.058] [0.144] [0.131] [0.716] [0.637] [0.024]
kl 0.062* 0.151* 0.025 0.538 0.518 0.019
[0.037] [0.085] [0.079] [0.448] [0.398] [0.016]
wastesortedp 0.006 0.003 0.026** 0.104 0.092 0.005*
[0.005] [0.011] [0.011] [0.064] [0.057] [0.002]
va_pcp −0.21 −0.255 −0.671* −3.156 −2.818 −0.123
[0.203] [0.526] [0.364] [2.301] [2.071] [0.083]
emp_shp −0.73 −0.378 −3.577 −13.795 −12.661 −0.165
[1.177] [2.833] [2.868] [15.138] [13.564] [0.475]
Observations 986 986 986 946 946 986
Pseudo R2 0.0504 0.087 0.087 0.066
Sigma 11.847*** 10.533***
[0.394] [0.348]
a NUTS2 region dummies and 2-digit NACE sector dummies are included in all speciﬁcations, but not reported. Robust standard errors clustered by NUTS3 region are in brackets.
Columns [4] and [5] report results from Tobit estimations.
* p<10%; ** p< 5%; *** p< 1%.
The second stage estimation substantially corroborates the base-
line estimation and the exogeneity test, reported at the bottom of
the table, suggests that endogeneity is not a concern in our setting.
We then rest on baseline probit estimation for the remaining of the
paper.
4.3. The Substitutability Between ENPOs and Sectoral Regulations
To test Hypothesis 2, in Table 4 we add an interaction term
between our proxy for local ENPOs (ENPO_pcp) and the sector-level
indicator of environmental stringency (env_string). We proceed by
exploiting two different proxies for regulations. In columns 1–2
we measure environmental stringency with the sector-level envi-
ronmental taxes over value added (source: Eurostat). In columns
3–6, we use sectoral emissions. In particular, sectors that are more
pollution-intensive and release substantial amounts of emissions
are those that are more likely to attract policy makers’ attention
and, then, to be subject to stricter regulations.20 Higher emissions
20 An example is represented by the EU Emission Trade System that mainly regulates
carbon dioxide emissions of energy and pollution intensive sectors.
per unit of value added then represent a good proxy for regulation
stringency. Speciﬁcally, we consider CO2 emissions, an indicator of
GWP and an indicator of acidiﬁcation. In columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, we
add the interaction between ENPO_pcp and the dummy env_string
D,
which identiﬁes sectors with values of environmental stringency
above the median, to our baseline speciﬁcation. While in columns
2, 4, 6, and 8 we replace the dummy variable with the continuous
value of environmental stringency (env_string), being the environ-
mental taxes per unit of value added or emissions per unit of value
added.
We ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the interaction
term irrespective of the indicator (i.e., environmental taxes or emis-
sions) and the measure (i.e., binary or continuous variable) used
to proxy for regulations. Since we control for 2-digit sector ﬁxed
effects, our model does not include either the binary or the continu-
ous term associated to environmental taxes and emissions. Although
our interest does not rely on the importance of regulations, when
we drop sector dummies, env_string bears a positive and highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
We conclude that ENPO_pcp is signiﬁcant only for family ﬁrms
active in sectors exposed to lower levels of environmental strin-
gency. Our ﬁnding then shows that ENPOs act as substitute for
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Table 3
Robustness and identiﬁcationa .
4 digit Instrumental variable
Dummies Second stage First stage
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
ENPOs_pcp 0.150*** 0.151*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 0.137*** 0.176*** 0.149**
[0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.038] [0.040] [0.075]
newwasteShMunicipalitiesp 0.001
[0.002]
newwasteShPopp 0.001
[0.001]
soc_capitalp 0.024
[0.015]
informalp −0.003
[0.007]
secondary_edup −0.308
[0.331]
non − ENPOs_pcp −0.109 −0.109 −0.127* −0.111* −0.104 −0.037 −0.109 0.871***
[0.067] [0.067] [0.068] [0.066] [0.066] [0.073] [0.100] [0.102]
mkt_prov 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
satisfaction 0.047 0.046 0.053 0.047 0.047 0.067* 0.048 0.006
[0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.040] [0.037] [0.017]
quality_cert 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.019 0.02 0.005 0.019 −0.024
[0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.021]
education −0.045 −0.045 −0.049 −0.046 −0.043 −0.051 −0.045 0.053
[0.070] [0.070] [0.071] [0.070] [0.070] [0.075] [0.071] [0.035]
rd_status 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.018
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] [0.028] [0.017]
patentFor 0.123 0.12 0.134 0.122 0.124 0.144 0.123 −0.03
[0.131] [0.130] [0.133] [0.130] [0.130] [0.152] [0.131] [0.056]
age 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.017 0.023 −0.023
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.035] [0.027] [0.016]
size −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.01 −0.011 −0.029 −0.01 −0.006
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.010]
kl 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.018 0.005
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.017] [0.015] [0.009]
wastesortedp 0.004 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.002 0.004* 0.011**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005]
va_pcp −0.113 −0.112 −0.126* −0.117 −0.088 −0.037 −0.112 0.007
[0.072] [0.072] [0.076] [0.074] [0.067] [0.108] [0.073] [0.155]
emp_shp −0.482 −0.461 −0.468 −0.541 −0.6 −1.704*** −0.512 0.197
[0.503] [0.487] [0.483] [0.508] [0.502] [0.581] [0.527] [1.090]
unused_housingp 0.018***
[0.003]
rainfallp −0.151***
[0.047]
Observations 986 986 986 986 986 851 986 986
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069 0.071 0.069 0.069 0.146
P_exog 0.983 0.983
a NUTS2 region dummies and 2-digit NACE sector dummies are included in all speciﬁcations, but not reported. All columns report marginal effects. Robust standard errors
clustered by NUTS3 region are in brackets. P_exog reports the p-value associated to the test of exogeneity.
* p<10%; ** p< 5%; *** p< 1%.
environmental regulations in promoting GIS engagement by family
ﬁrms and supports Hypothesis 2.
5. Conclusions
Firms’ GIS are fundamental to achieve a sustainable economic
path because they substantially contribute to gain competitiveness
and expand the knowledge stock and innovative capacity of a coun-
try. For these reasons both academics and policy-makers have paid
increasing attention in understanding the drivers fostering ﬁrms’
GIS.
We add to this discussion by focusing on the role of ENPOs
as a distinctive type of societal stakeholder, and by shedding light
on the distinction between family and non-family ﬁrms. We sug-
gest that family-ﬁrms are more likely to engage in GIS in response
to ENPOs’ normative pressure than non-family ﬁrms due to their
resource constraints, which make them less capable to bear the
costs of head-to-head confrontation with ENPOs (Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2003; Hamelin, 2013; Zellweger and Sieger, 2012), and to the
greater value they attach to local socio-emotional rewards that
serve as “a form of social insurance in times of crisis” (dye, 2006).
Furthermore, we uncover that the normative pressure exerted by
local ENPOs substitutes for the coercive pressure of environmen-
tal regulation in sectors where regulation is less strict, thus pro-
moting family ﬁrms’ self-regulatory behaviors. We ﬁnd empirical
support for our arguments on a sample of Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms.
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Table 4
The role of sectoral regulations.
Environmental taxes Emissions
GWP CO2 Acidiﬁcation
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
ENPOs_pcp 0.178*** 0.214*** 0.213*** 0.391*** 0.213*** 0.387*** 0.207*** 0.129***
[0.044] [0.050] [0.043] [0.125] [0.043] [0.127] [0.043] [0.036]
ENPOs_pcp*env_string
D −0.141** −0.139** −0.139** −0.118**
[0.070] [0.062] [0.062] [0.059]
ENPOs_pcp*env_string −3.054** −0.044** −0.043* −0.044*
[1.320] [0.022] [0.022] [0.024]
non − ENPOs_pcp −0.104 −0.1 −0.099 −0.102 −0.099 −0.102 −0.1 −0.103
[0.069] [0.068] [0.069] [0.068] [0.069] [0.068] [0.068] [0.067]
mkt_prov 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
satisfaction 0.064* 0.064* 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.048 0.049
[0.038] [0.038] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]
quality_cert 0.013 0.015 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.036] [0.036] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034]
education −0.03 −0.03 −0.045 −0.045 −0.045 −0.045 −0.046 −0.046
[0.075] [0.075] [0.070] [0.071] [0.070] [0.071] [0.070] [0.071]
rd_status 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
patentFor 0.149 0.152 0.12 0.121 0.12 0.121 0.121 0.121
[0.141] [0.141] [0.132] [0.131] [0.132] [0.131] [0.131] [0.131]
age 0.019 0.017 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
size −0.008 −0.008 −0.015 −0.013 −0.015 −0.012 −0.013 −0.012
[0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
kl 0.024 0.023 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
[0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
wastesortedp 0.005* 0.005* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
va_pcp −0.125* −0.112 −0.093 −0.102 −0.093 −0.103 −0.096 −0.104
[0.072] [0.073] [0.079] [0.076] [0.079] [0.076] [0.078] [0.074]
emp_shp −0.376 −0.381 −0.559 −0.545 −0.559 −0.546 −0.574 −0.555
[0.577] [0.584] [0.516] [0.506] [0.516] [0.506] [0.510] [0.503]
Observations 905 905 986 986 986 986 986 986
Pseudo R2 0.079 0.08 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.071
a NUTS2 region dummies and 2-digit NACE sector dummies are included in all speciﬁcations, but not reported.All columns report marginal effects. Robust standard errors clustered
by NUTS3 regions are in brackets. P-value difference reports the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference in the coeﬃcient between equations.
* p<10%; ** p< 5% level; *** p< 1%.
Some policy implications emerge from our study. While regula-
tions preserve their prominent role for the environment protection,
their enforcement can face some diﬃculties. To promote environ-
mental protection, the involvement of speciﬁc types of societal
stakeholders turns out to be critical. Whether local ENPOs can
push local ﬁrms to adapt new environmental standards and ease
innovation, or whether they promote ﬁrms’ competitiveness, their
action, like market-based environmental policies, has the advan-
tage to provide greater ﬂexibility to internalize pollution costs. The
normative pressure local ENPOs exert may then be more effective
than the coercive pressure of command-and-control regulatory poli-
cies, which fail to offer such ﬂexibility. At the same time, local
ENPOs exert a more capillary action than top-down market-based
environmental policies, which may offer limited social rewards. The
ﬁndings of our study bear also relevant implications for a number
of European countries, where, like in Italy, family ﬁrms are the most
common organizational form of economic activities. In these con-
texts, the positive pressure of ENPOs on GIS engagement by family
business may turn into sizeable environmental beneﬁts for society.
Furthermore, our analysis suggest that the efforts of policy-maker
should be directed to involve these societal actors in the implemen-
tation of, for example, environmental education programs aimed
at the creation of an environmental ethic and at the promotion of
ecologically oriented changes in values and behaviors.
Our study presents a number of limitations, which may inspire
future research. First, our data enable us to investigate the inﬂu-
ence of ENPOs on the likelihood of ﬁrms GIS. Yet, we lack a precise
measure of the amounts of green investments to investigate the
ENPOs inﬂuence on the intensity of ﬁrms’ environmental invest-
ments. Future studies may explore this aspect. Second, we lack
information about the nature of environmental investments (e.g.,
whether they trigger the introduction of sustainable products or
production processes). The availability of such data would help
understand the response of ﬁrms to ENPOs pressure by disclos-
ing the existence of heterogeneous effects across different types
of investments. In particular, investments aiming at sustainable
production processes could be considered of greater interest for
the local communities, and family ﬁrms could favor them over
investments more oriented toward product sustainability. At the
same time, ENPOs pressure may be more compelling towards the
adoption of production processes (e.g. energy-saving processes),
which delivers beneﬁcial effects that external actors, such as non-
coercive societal stakeholders, cannot immediately observe and
assess.
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Table A1
Appendix A.
Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics (obs. 2275).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 GreenInv 1
2 ENPOs_pcp 0.0427b 1
3 non − ENPOs_pcp 0.0239 0.6692a 1
4 mkt_prov 0.0105 0.0052 0.01 1
5 satisfaction 0.0890a −0.0198 −0.0407c −0.0396c 1
6 quality_cert 0.1310a −0.0238 −0.0728a −0.1042a 0.4075a 1
7 education 0.0097 −0.0815a −0.0471b −0.0605a 0.0518b 0.1425a 1
8 rd_status 0.1077a 0.0641a 0.0593a −0.1449a 0.0921a 0.1387a 0.1190a 1
9 group 0.0675a −0.0043 −0.011 −0.1012a 0.0422b 0.1728a 0.1626a 0.1801a 1
10 patentFor 0.0471b 0.0602a 0.0546a −0.052b 0.0557a 0.0131 0.0298 0.0741a 0.0739a 1
11 age 0.0155 0.0405c 0.0258 −0.0114 0.0138 0.0217 −0.0680a 0.047b −0.0677a 0.0493b 1
12 size 0.1157a 0.038c 0.0368 −0.1976a 0.1193a 0.2480a 0.0364c 0.2701a 0.4331a 0.1310a 0.1085a 1
13 kl 0.1009a −0.0417b −0.0821a −0.0406c 0.0730a 0.2070a 0.0349c 0.0108 0.1095a 0.0069 0.0685a 0.0850a 1
14 wastesortedp −0.049b 0.1318a 0.0122 0.0238 0.001 −0.0774a −0.0996a 0.0971a 0.024 0.0399c 0.1493a 0.009 −0.1230a 1
15 va_pcp −0.0570a 0.1860a 0.2116a 0.0268 −0.0289 −0.0896a −0.002 0.1578a 0.0448b 0.0104 0.1330a 0.0338 −0.1865a 0.6349a 1
16 emp_shp −0.0483b 0.3713a 0.3610a 0.0318 −0.0222 −0.1036a −0.1060a 0.1465a 0.0278 0.0412b 0.1222a 0.0208 −0.1646a 0.7098a 0.7368a 1
Mean 0.519 −9.988 −5.515 11.077 0.722 0.551 0.433 0.490 0.282 0.021 3.195 3.918 3.387 20.206 9.875 0.467
Sd 0.500 0.501 0.354 23.991 0.448 0.498 0.259 0.500 0.450 0.142 0.614 0.962 1.107 12.375 0.279 0.056
Min 0 −12.597 −6.497 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.693 2.079 −4.360 0 8.910 0.287
Max 1 −8.546 −4.639 100 1 1 1 1 1 1 5.242 8.866 6.283 44.6 10.984 0.560
a p<1%; b p< 5% level; c p< 10%.
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